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Networks: Beneficial and Adversarial Aspects
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Abstract—Interference alignment (IA) is a prospective method
to achieve interference management in wireless networks. On
the other hand, jamming can be deemed either as a potential
threat to degrade the performance of wireless networks, or as a
helper to combat the eavesdropping for the legitimate networks.
In this paper, we consider these two opposite scenarios, beneficial
and adversarial jamming, towards IA networks, and based on
which two proactive jamming schemes are proposed. In the first
scheme, the jammer utilizes its precoding vector to constrain the
jamming signal into the same subspace as the interference at
each IA receiver, which will disrupt the potential eavesdropping
significantly without affecting the transmission of IA users.
Specifically, secure transmission can be guaranteed through the
jamming without any additional cooperation with the IA users.
In the second scheme, the jammer utilizes its precoding vector to
project the jamming signal into the same subspace as that of the
desired signal at each IA receiver secretly. Thus, the IA users
cannot detect the concealed jamming signal, which will result
in the performance degradation of the IA network. Extensive
simulation results are presented to show the effectiveness of the
two proposed jamming schemes towards IA networks.
Index Terms—Eavesdropping, interference alignment, physical
layer security, proactive jamming.
I. INTRODUCTION
Due to the broadcast nature, interference is always an
important factor that impacts the performances of wireless
networks. Thus, interference management becomes increasing-
ly important in wireless communications [2]–[6]. Interference
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alignment (IA) is a prospective method to achieve interfer-
ence management in multi-user networks, through which the
interference among users can be projected into the lower-
dimensional subspaces by precoding matrices, and then the
desired signal can be retrieved by decoding matrices with
no residual interference [7]–[9]. In the past decade, IA has
attracted significant attention from academia, industry and
government, and several challenging problems have been pre-
sented and solved accordingly [7], [10]–[17]. In [7], Cadambe
and Jafar analyzed the degrees of freedom (DoFs) and the sum
rate of a K-user IA network, and showed that it is difficult
to obtain the closed-form solutions of IA when the number
of users becomes larger. Whereafter, two iterative algorithms
were proposed by Gomadam et al. to solve this intractable
problem of IA, i.e., MinIL and Max-SINR algorithms [10].
The feasibility conditions of IA have been studied in [11],
which determine the relationship between the number of users,
antennas and DoFs. The signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio
(SINR) of the received signal may decrease severely in some
cases, which will affect the quality of service (QoS) of IA
networks [10]. In our previous works, we have also focused
on this aspect [12]–[14]. In addition, global channel state
information (CSI) of the entire IA network should be available
at each transceiver, which is also a critical requirement to
achieve [15]–[19].
On the other hand, the security of information transmission
is a challenging issue in wireless applications [20], when
wireless networks are often used for transmission of private
information, such as credit card transaction or banking related
data communication. Different from the traditional network
security aspect, physical layer security has attracted great
attention in recent research, through which the security of
wireless transmission can be guaranteed through physical-
layer techniques. Eavesdropping and jamming are two main
attacks at the physical layer, which aim at intercepting con-
fidential information and disrupting the information transmis-
sion of legitimate networks, respectively [21]–[31]. In [32],
[33], excellent works has been done by Darsena et al. on re-
sisting narrowband interference for multicarrier systems. Some
fundamental research work on the physical layer security
of IA networks has been done in [34]. When jamming is
considered, the jamming signal can be utilized not only to
degrade the transmission performance of wireless networks,
but also to help the legitimate networks to disrupt the potential
eavesdropping. Thus, in this paper, we consider these two
opposite scenarios, i.e., the beneficial and adversarial jamming
2signals, towards IA networks as follows.
First, jamming can be beneficial for IA networks. When
some potential eavesdropper exists, it is important to ensure
that the confidential information will not be intercepted by
the eavesdropper. There are several methods to prevent the
eavesdropping, and a reliable one is to generate artificial
noise (AN), also called friendly jamming, to combat the
eavesdropping [21]–[24]. However, the major challenge of
utilizing jamming to guarantee the security is that while
destroying the eavesdropping, the transmission of legitimate
users will also be affected. To solve this problem, IA can be
leveraged due to its capability in interference management,
and some initial research works have been done to utilize
jamming to guarantee the security of IA networks [35]–[37].
In [35], [36], a generalized interference alignment (GIA)
technique was proposed by Ruan et al. to generate strong
jamming signal at the eavesdropper with the help of IA users to
enhance the secrecy rate. In [37], AN was generated along with
the transmitted signal of IA users to prevent eavesdropping.
Nevertheless, additional overload will be imposed on the
legitimate IA network by these methods, in addition to the high
requirement of CSI and solutions of IA. Thus, in this paper,
from the perspective of jammer, we design the precoding
jamming vector to proactively align the jamming into the same
subspace as that of the interference at each legitimate receiver
without additional cooperation of the IA users, so that the IA
users can eliminate the interference and jamming at the same
time only by using the original decoding matrices.
Moreover, the jamming signal can also be adversarial for IA
networks. Recently, criminals and terrorists can easily establish
infrastructure-free wireless communications to commit crimes
or terror attacks, and IA is an effective way to construct such
an illegal multi-user network. In [38], [39], the information
surveillance was performed to control the suspicious transmis-
sion by proactive eavesdropping methods, in which legitimate
monitor overhears the suspicious transmitter and concurrently
forwards a spoofing signal to the suspicious receiver to degrade
its transmission. However, when the anti-jamming IA scheme
is leveraged [28], [29], the illegal IA network can eliminate the
jamming signal and guarantee its transmission. Thus, how to
design the proactive jamming signal to disrupt the IA network
without its noticing is the key issue for the surveillance of
illegal IA networks. In this paper, an appropriate method is
proposed to proactively align the jamming signal into the same
subspace as that of the desired signal at each IA receiver, so
that the IA users cannot perceive the existence of jamming
signal.
Considering the beneficial and adversarial aspects of proac-
tive jamming for IA networks, the main contributions of this
paper are summarized as follows.
 With regard to the physical layer security, the jamming
signal can be either beneficial or adversarial towards IA
networks. Thus, in this paper, two proactive jamming
schemes are proposed towards IA networks from a novel
point of view, to guarantee the secure transmission or to
disrupt the transmission, respectively.
 When a potential eavesdropper may exist, we fully utilize
the beneficial aspect of the jamming signal as spurious
data to disrupt the eavesdropping. To further ensure that
the IA transmission is not affected by the jamming
signal, the precoding vector of the jammer is designed to
proactively constrain the jamming into the same subspace
as that of the interference at each IA receiver, without
cooperation of the IA network.
 On the other hand, when the adversarial aspect of jam-
ming is considered towards IA networks, the IA transmis-
sion can be degraded by the jamming signal without being
noticed. To achieve this goal, the precoding vector of
the jammer is designed to proactively align the jamming
signal into the same subspace as the desired signal at each
IA receiver, and thus the IA network cannot perceive the
jamming.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section
II, the system model is presented. The beneficial jamming
scheme towards IA networks is proposed in Section III, and
the eavesdropping performance is analyzed. In Section IV, the
adversarial jamming scheme towards IA networks is proposed.
In Section V, simulation results are presented and discussed,
followed by the conclusions and future work in Section VI.
Notation: Id represents the d d identity matrix. Ay is the
Hermitian transpose of matrix A. k  k is the Euclidean norm
of a complex vector. CN (a;A) denotes a circularly symmetric
complex Gaussian distribution with mean a and covariance
matrix A. a ^ b denotes the cross product of a and b. E()
stands for expectation.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a K-user IA network, where a potential eaves-
dropper with Ne antennas is intended to wiretap the confiden-
tial information from IA links. A jammer with Nj independent
antennas also exists to transmit spurious data to degrade the
transmission of IA network or to disrupt the eavesdropping.
M [k] and N [k] antennas are equipped at the kth transmitter
and the kth receiver of the IA network, respectively. Based on
these assumptions, the recovered signal at the kth IA receiver
can be expressed as
y[k]=U[k]yH[kk]V[k]x[k]
+
KX
i=1;i 6=k
U[k]yH[ki]V[i]x[i]+U[k]yH[k]j wxj+U
[k]yn[k]; (1)
where H[ki] 2 CN [k]M [i] is the channel coefficient matrix
from the ith IA transmitter to the kth IA receiver1, whose
elements are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.)
and follow CN (0; 1). H[k]j 2 CN
[k]Nj is the channel coef-
ficient matrix between the jammer and the kth IA receiver.
w 2 CNj1 is the precoding vector of the jammer. xj
denotes the jamming signal generated by the jammer, with its
transmit power set to Pj . d[k] is the number of data streams
transmitted by the kth IA user. x[k] 2 Cd[k]1 is the signal
emitted by the kth IA user, whose transmit power equals to
E
hx[k]2i = P [k]. V[k] 2 CM [k]d[k] and U[k] 2 CN [k]d[k]
1In this paper, perfect CSI is assumed at each legitimate node. Methods in
[15]–[17] can be used to evaluate imperfect CSI in our proposed schemes.
3TABLE I
EXISTING ANTI-EAVESDROPPING SCHEMES FOR IA NETWORKS
Reference Method Superiority Drawback
[35], [36] LJs are cooperated with the
IA network.
Transmit power of the jammer is not limited. (1) Jamming and AN are designed
with the help of IA.
(2) More antennas are needed than
the original IA network.
[37] AN is generated along with
the transmitted signal.
No additional transmitters are needed to perform
jamming; fewer antennas are needed than [35], [36].
are the precoding and decoding matrices of the kth IA trans-
mitter and receiver, respectively, satisfying V[k]yV[k] = Id[k]
and U[k]yU[k] = Id[k] . n[k] 2 CN
[k]1 is the additive white
Gaussian noise (AWGN) at the kth IA receiver, which follows
the distribution CN (0; 2nIN [k]).
When the interference among IA transceivers can be ef-
fectively eliminated, the precoding matrices and the decoding
matrices should satisfy the following conditions.
rank

U[k]yH[kk]V[k]

= d[k]; (2)
U[k]yH[ki]V[i] = 0; 8i 6= k: (3)
Consequently, the expression of the recovered signal at the kth
IA receiver in (1) can be rewritten as
y[k] = U[k]yH[kk]V[k]x[k] + U[k]yH[k]j wxj + U
[k]yn[k]: (4)
Due to the existence of the jamming signal, the transmission
rate of the kth IA user can be denoted as
R[k]=log2
Id[k]+
P [k]
d[k]
U[k]yH[kk]V[k]V[k]yH[kk]yU[k]
U[k]y

PjH
[k]
j wwyH
[k]y
j +
2
nIN [k]

U[k]
: (5)
From (5), we can observe that the transmission rate of IA
users will be degraded severely if the jamming signal is not
properly removed. The transmission rate will decrease when
the transmit power of the jammer increases. For simplicity, all
the IA users are assumed to have the same parameters in the
rest of this paper, i.e., M [k] =M , N [k] = N , d[k] = 1.
Remark 1: In this paper, we consider two opposite aspects,
i.e., beneficial and adversarial jamming towards IA networks,
and two proactive jamming schemes are proposed correspond-
ingly. First, to guarantee the security of IA network, jamming
can be utilized to disrupt the eavesdropping by generating
spurious data in Section III, without affecting the legitimate
transmission. Then, the jamming signal can also be designed
to degrade the performance of the IA network without noticing
in Section IV.
III. BENEFICIAL JAMMING TOWARDS IA NETWORKS
To guarantee the secure transmission of IA networks, several
anti-eavesdropping schemes have been proposed in [35]–[37].
In [35], [36], the GIA technique was proposed to enhance
the secrecy rate of IA networks, which jointly coordinates
the transmission policy of the legitimate jammer (LJ) and IA
users to generate stronger interference at the eavesdropper. In
[37], the AN was designed to be generated along with the
information data streams at each IA transmitter to disrupt
Fig. 1. Configuration of beneficial jamming towards the IA network to
combat the eavesdropping.
the eavesdropping. The contributions of these schemes are
outlined in Table I.
From Table I, we can conclude that, although the potential
eavesdropping of the IA network can be effectively disrupted
by these two methods, there still exist some drawbacks. First,
additional overload will be imposed on the legitimate IA
network by these methods, in addition to the high requirement
of CSI and solutions of IA. Thus, the IA network should make
more effort to combat the eavesdropping through cooperat-
ing with the jammers. In addition, the number of antennas
equipped at the transceivers of these two schemes increase
compared to the original IA network. Thus, the jamming
signal should be further designed to guarantee the secure
transmission of the IA network without its additional help.
Thus, in this section, the proactive jamming scheme to
combat potential eavesdropping for IA networks is presented
first, and then, the performance of the eavesdropping will be
analyzed for the proposed scheme.
A. Proactive Jamming Design
As shown in Fig. 1, we consider a legitimate IA network
with an adversarial eavesdropper and a friendly jammer. The
existence of the eavesdropper will threaten the secure transmis-
sion between the legitimate IA transmitters and receivers. The
friendly jammer is intended to emit spurious data to disrupt
the eavesdropping for the IA network. Nevertheless, from the
expression of transmission rate for the kth IA user in (5),
we can conclude that the jamming signal will also deteriorate
the information transmission of the IA users, which should
be properly designed to be compatible with the legitimate
IA network. Specifically, the precoding vector of the jammer
4should be designed to constrain the jamming signal into the
same subspace as that of the interference among IA users
at each receiver, as shown in Fig. 1, without any additional
overload of the IA network. As a result, the jamming signal
and interference can be eliminated together by the original
decoding matrix at each IA receiver.
In order to constrain the jamming signal into the same
subspace as the interference, the following conditions for the
ith IA user should be satisfied as
H[i]j w = 
[i]H[iq]v[q]; 8i = 1; 2; :::;K; q 6= i; (6)
where [i] is a scaling factor to make the equation balanced.
As i = 1; 2; :::;K in (6), we can rewrite the equation (6) as
Aw = b; (7)
where
A =
0BBBB@
H[1]j
H[2]j
...
H[K]j
1CCCCA ; (8)
and
b =
0BBB@
[1]H[1q]v[q1]
[2]H[2q]v[q2]
...
[K]H[Kq]v[qK ]
1CCCA ; qi 6= i; i = 1; 2; : : : ;K: (9)
In (9), the jamming signal can be aligned at each IA receiver
to the interference from any IA user, but not the interference
from all the other users, because the interference from the
other users has been aligned into the same subspace according
to (3).
The design of the jamming precoding vector w to achieve
(7) can be summarized in Theorem 1.
Theorem 1: To align the jamming signal into the same
subspace as that of the interference at each IA user according
to (7), the jamming precoding vector w should be designed as
w = A 1b+ (INj   A 1A); (10)
where  2 CNj1 is an arbitrary vector.
Proof: Based on the matrix theory, for the linear equation
(7), when A is a non-singular matrix, the solution will be
A 1b, where A 1 satisfying A 1A = INj is the generalized
inverse matrix of A.
When A is a singular matrix, the equation (7) has either no
solution, or infinitely many solutions. If the solution exists,
it will be A 1b + (INj   A 1A), where A 1 satisfying
AA 1A = A is the generalized inverse matrix of A.
Specifically, when A is non-singular, A 1A = INj also
satisfies AA 1A = A, and A 1b + (INj   A 1A) = A 1b.
Thus, the jamming precoding vector w has a unified expression
as (10).
According to (3) and (6), after generating the jamming
signal with the vector w according to Theorem 1, the jamming
signal can be eliminated together with the interference by the
original decoding vector at each legitimate IA receiver.
In (10), the main purpose of w is to align the jamming
signal into the same subspace as that of the interference at
each IA user, so that the jamming signal can be eliminated
perfectly together with the interference between users. Thus,
the arbitrary vector  will not affect the performance of the
proposed beneficial jamming scheme, due to the fact that
the jamming signal will be eliminated perfectly at each IA
receiver, no matter what value  is. In addition, since we do
not have the knowledge of the eavesdropping CSI, we cannot
design  to disrupt the eavesdropping more effectively.
Based on Theorem 1, the beneficial jamming scheme to-
wards the IA network to disrupt the potential eavesdropping
can be summarized as in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Beneficial jamming scheme
1: The nth time slot begins.
2: The legitimate IA network calculate its precoding and
decoding vectors for all the users.
3: The instantaneous CSI of the IA network is obtained by
the jammer.
4: The jammer sets the value of the scaling factor [i], i =
1; 2; : : : ;K.
5: According to (10), the jammer calculates its precoding
vector w.
6: Perform secure transmission of the IA network with the
help of the jammer.
7: Current time slot ends, n = n+ 1, back to Step 1.
Through Algorithm 1, the recovered signal at the kth IA
receiver can be expressed as
y[k] =
KX
i=1
u[k]yH[ki]v[i]x[i] + u[k]yH[k]j wxj + u
[k]yn[k]
= u[k]yH[kk]v[k]x[k] + u[k]yn[k]; (11)
in which the jamming signal and interference from other users
can be perfectly eliminated by the original decoding vector
of IA. Accordingly, the transmission rate of the kth user
expressed in (5) can be rewritten as
R[k] = log2
0@1 + P [k]u[k]yH[kk]v[k]v[k]yH[kk]yu[k]
u[k]y

PjH
[k]
j wwyH
[k]y
j + 
2
n

u[k]
1A
= log2
 
1 +
P [k]u[k]yH[kk]v[k]v[k]yH[kk]yu[k]
2n
!
: (12)
From (12), we can also conclude that the legitimate transmis-
sion of the IA network will not be affected by the jamming
signal, and secure transmission of the IA network can be
guaranteed by the beneficial jamming according to Algorithm
1 without performance degradation.
To perfectly achieve (11) and (12) through Algorithm 1, the
feasibility condition of the beneficial jamming scheme should
be developed, through which we can determine the minimal
number of antennas that should be equipped at the jammer.
According to Bezout’s Theorem, we can know that a generic
polynomial system is solvable if and only if the number of
variables is no less than the number of equations [11]. Thus,
5the feasibility condition of the beneficial jamming scheme can
be derived as Theorem 2.
Theorem 2: The feasibility condition of the beneficial
jamming scheme can be expressed as
KN  Nj : (13)
Proof: The total number of equations in conditions (7)
can be denoted as
Ne = KN: (14)
The precoding vector w of the jammer has Nj variables,
i.e., the total number of variables in conditions (7) can be
calculated as
Nv = Nj : (15)
Based on Bezout’s Theorem, when the polynomial (7) is
solvable, we have
Ne  Nv ) KN  Nj : (16)
Thus, Theorem 2 is proved.
From Theorem 2, we can know that when the number
of antennas at the jammer is no less than the total number
of antennas at the K IA receivers, the proposed beneficial
jamming scheme is feasible, i.e., the secure transmission of the
IA network can be guaranteed by the jamming signal without
affecting the transmission rate of the IA users. Thus, we can
conclude that in the beneficial jamming scheme, the jamming
signal will not affect the DoFs of the original IA network,
when the feasibility conditions can be satisfied.
B. Eavesdropping Performance Analysis
To further demonstrate the effectiveness of the jamming
signal, we analyze the performance of the eavesdropping when
the jamming signal is present or not. In the design of the
proposed beneficial jamming scheme in Section III-A, the
CSI from eavesdropper is not needed; while to analyze the
eavesdropping performance towards our proposed scheme, the
eavesdropping CSI is needed, which does not mean that the
CSI from eavesdropper is needed in our proposed scheme.
First, consider the situation that the jamming signal is not
generated towards the legitimate IA network. To eavesdrop
the information of the kth IA user, the received signal at the
eavesdropper through its decoding vector u[k]e can be expressed
as
y[k]e = u
[k]y
e G
[k]
e v
[k]x[k]+
KX
i=1;i 6=k
u[k]ye G
[i]
e v
[i]x[i]+u[k]ye ne; (17)
where G[i]e 2 CNeM
[i]
is the channel coefficient matrix from
the ith transmitter to the eavesdropper, each entity of which
is i.i.d. and follows CN (0; 1). u[k]e 2 CNe1 is the decoding
vector at the eavesdropper targeting the kth user. n[k]e 2 CNe1
is the AWGN vector at the eavesdropper.
The eavesdropping rate of the kth IA user can be expressed
as
R[k]e =log2
0BBB@1+ P [k]u
[k]y
e G[k]e v[k]v[k]yG
[k]y
e u
[k]
e
2n+P
[i]
KP
i=1;i 6=k
u[k]ye G[i]e v[i]v[i]yG
[i]y
e u
[k]
e
1CCCA: (18)
Accordingly, the secrecy rate of the kth legitimate IA user
can be expressed as (19) (on the next page), where x+ =
max(x; 0).
To eavesdrop the information transmitted by the kth legiti-
mate IA user without any residual interference, the following
condition should be satisfied.
u[k]ye G
[i]
e v
[i] = 0; 8i 6= k: (20)
Thus, the zero-forcing method should be utilized by the eaves-
dropper with enough antennas to eliminate the interference,
and the feasibility condition of the eavesdropper can be derived
in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1: In the case that no jamming signal exists,
to eavesdrop a certain IA user free of interference, the number
of antennas equipped at the eavesdropper should satisfy
Ne  K: (21)
Proof: To eavesdrop the transmitted information of the
kth IA user free of interference, the interference from other
users should be zero-forced perfectly with (20) satisfied.
According to the conclusion in [11], the number of variables
and equations in (20) can be expressed as in (22) and (23),
respectively.
Nv = Ne   1: (22)
Ne = K   1: (23)
Based on Bezout’s Theorem, when the polynomial (20) is
solvable, we have
Nv  Ne ) Ne   1  K   1) Ne  K: (24)
When the condition (21) can be satisfied, the interference
from other IA users will be eliminated perfectly at the eaves-
dropper, and the eavesdropping rate will be enhanced greatly.
In consequence, the secrecy rate will also be reduced close to
zero.
Then, we consider the situation that the beneficial jamming
is generated towards the IA network to prevent eavesdropping.
To eavesdrop the information of the kth IA user, the received
signal at the eavesdropper through its decoding vector u^[k]e can
be expressed as
y^[k]e = u^
[k]y
e G
[k]
e v
[k]x[k] +
KX
i=1;i 6=k
u^[k]ye G
[i]
e v
[i]x[i]
+ u^[k]ye Gjwxj + u^
[k]y
e ne: (25)
where Gj 2 CNeNj is the channel coefficient matrix between
the jammer and the eavesdropper, each entity of which is i.i.d.
and follows CN (0; 1).
The eavesdropping rate of the kth IA user when considering
the jamming signal can be expressed as
R^[k]e = log2
 
1 +
P [k]u^[k]ye G
[k]
e v[k]v[k]yG
[k]y
e u^
[k]
e
2n + Q^
[k]
e
!
; (26)
6R[k]s =

R[k]  R[k]e
+
=
0BBBBBBBB@
log2
0BBBBBBBB@
1 +
P [k]
2n
u[k]yH[kk]v[k]v[k]yH[kk]yu[k]
1 +
P [k]u[k]ye G[k]e v[k]v[k]yG
[k]y
e u
[k]
e
2n + P
[i]
KP
i=1;i 6=k
u[k]ye G[i]e v[i]v[i]yG
[i]y
e u
[k]
e
1CCCCCCCCA
1CCCCCCCCA
+
: (19)
R^[k]s = (R
[k]   R^[k]e )+ =
0BBBBBBBB@
log2
0BBBBBBBB@
1 +
P [k]
2n
u[k]yH[kk]v[k]v[k]yH[kk]yu[k]
1 +
P [k]u^[k]ye G
[k]
e v[k]v[k]yG
[k]y
e u^
[k]
e
2n + P
[i]
KP
i=1;i6=k
u^[k]ye G
[i]
e v[i]v[i]yG
[i]y
e u^
[k]
e + Pj u^
[k]y
e GjwwyG
y
j u^
[k]
e
1CCCCCCCCA
1CCCCCCCCA
+
: (28)
where
Q^[k]e =P
[i]
KX
i=1;i 6=k
u^[k]ye G
[i]
e v
[i]v[i]yG[i]ye u^
[k]
e
+Pj u^[k]ye Gjww
yGyj u^
[k]
e : (27)
Therefore, the secrecy rate of the kth legitimate IA user can
be expressed as (28).
To eavesdrop the information transmitted by the kth le-
gitimate user without any residual interference and jamming
signal, the interference and jamming signal must be eliminated
completely. According to (9) and (10), we can know that the
precoding vector w of the jammer can be changed according to
the parameters [1]; [2]; : : : ; [K]. To combat the eavesdrop-
ping, we can make the vector w varying all the time when
the parameters [1]; [2]; : : : ; [K] are set to be varying, and
the eavesdropper cannot estimate w at each time slot like v[i],
i = 1; 2; : : : ;K. Therefore, in addition to (20), the following
condition must be satisfied.
u^[k]ye Gj = 01Nj : (29)
Thus, the zero-forcing method should be leveraged by the
eavesdropper with enough antennas to eliminate the interfer-
ence and the jamming signal, and the feasibility condition of
the eavesdropper with the existence of jamming signal can be
derived in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2: In the case that the beneficial jamming
exists, to eavesdrop a certain IA user free of interference
and jamming signal, the number of antennas equipped at the
eavesdropper should satisfy
Ne  K +Nj : (30)
Proof: To eavesdrop the transmitted information of the
the k IA user, the interference and jamming signal should be
zero-forced together with equations (20) and (29) satisfied.
According to the conclusion in [11], the number of variables
and equations in (29) are Ne   1 and Nj , respectively. Thus,
together with the conclusion in Proposition 1, we can know
that the total number of variables and equations in (20) and
(29) can be expressed as
Nv = Ne   1 (31)
Ne = K   1 +Nj : (32)
Based on Bezout’s Theorem, when the polynomials (20) and
(29) are solvable, we have
Nv  Ne ) Ne   1  K   1 +Nj ) Ne  K +Nj : (33)
Remark 2: Observing Proposition 1 and Proposition 2,
we can conclude that when the beneficial jamming signal
is generated towards the IA network, the eavesdropper has
to add additional Nj number of antennas to achieve perfect
eavesdropping compared to that without jamming. Especially,
when the proposed beneficial jamming scheme is feasible,
Nj = KN , which means that at least KN additional eaves-
dropping antennas should be equipped, which is a challenging
requirement for the eavesdropper. Besides, from (19) and
(28), we can also know that the performance of the secure
transmission will be improved by the jamming signal with the
same number of eavesdropping antennas.
IV. ADVERSARIAL JAMMING TOWARDS IA NETWORKS
The openness of wireless channel makes it more vulner-
able to be abused by some vicious organizations to commit
crimes. Recently, criminals and terrorists can easily establish
infrastructure-free wireless communications to commit crimes
or terror attack, and IA is an effective way to construct such an
illegal multi-user network. Therefore, it becomes increasingly
important for governmental agencies to monitor the suspicious
links and take some valid measures to disrupt the illegal
transmission.
In [38], [39], the information surveillance was performed to
combat the suspicious transmission, in which the governmental
monitor overhears the suspicious transmitter and concurrently
forwards a spoofing signal to the suspicious receiver to disrupt
its transmission. However, when the anti-jamming IA scheme
7Fig. 2. Configuration of adversarial jamming to disrupt the IA network
without noticing.
is exploited [28], the illegal IA network can eliminate the
jamming signal and guarantee its transmission. Thus, how to
design the proactive jamming signal to disrupt the IA network
without its noticing is the key issue for the surveillance
of illegal IA networks. Thus, in this section, we consider
an information surveillance scenario, where an adversarial
jammer is intended to send spurious data to degrade the
performance of IA network secretly, as shown in Fig. 2. From
the figure, we can see that the adversarial jamming signal is
aligned into the same subspace as that of the desired signal at
each IA receiver. Thus, the transmission of IA network will be
severely disrupted, while the IA users cannot easily perceive.
When IA is performed, the transmission rate of the kth
IA user has the same expression as (12). To deteriorate the
IA transmission, we propose an adversarial jamming scheme,
through which the jamming signal is constrained into the same
subspace as that of the desired signal at each IA receiver, and
thus, it is difficult for the IA users to perceive the adversarial
jamming signal.
In order to project the jamming signal into the same
subspace as that of the desired signal at each IA receiver,
the following conditions should be satisfied.
H[i]j w = 
[i]H[ii]v[i]; 8i = 1; 2; :::;K; (34)
where [i] is a scaling factor to make the equation balanced.
As i = 1; 2; :::;K in (34), we can rewrite the equation (34)
as
Cw = d; (35)
where
C = A =
0BBBB@
H[1]j
H[2]j
...
H[K]j
1CCCCA ; (36)
and
d =
0BBB@
[1]H[11]v[1]
[2]H[22]v[2]
...
[K]H[KK]v[K]
1CCCA : (37)
The design of the jamming precoding vector w to achieve (35)
can be summarized in Theorem 3.
Theorem 3: To constrain the jamming signal into the same
subspace as that of the desired signal at each IA receiver
according to (35), the jamming precoding vector w should
be designed as
w = C 1d+ (INj   C 1C); (38)
where  2 CNj1 is an arbitrary vector.
Proof: The proof is the same as that of Theorem 1, which
will not be repeated here.
According to (3) and (34), after generating the adversarial
jamming signal with the vector w according to Theorem 3,
the jamming signal can be aligned into the same subspace as
that of the desired signal at each IA receiver. Thus, with the
jamming signal not noticing, the transmission performance of
the IA network will be severely degraded, due to the fact that
the jamming signal is treated as background noise by IA users.
In (38), the main purpose of w is to constrain the jamming
signal into the same subspace as that of the desired signal
at each IA receiver, and the transmission of IA network will
be disrupted without noticing. For the arbitrary vector , it
will not affect the alignment of the jamming signal, and
the effective jamming power at the kth IA receiver is only
determined by [k], instead of . Thus, the value of  will not
affect the performance of the proposed adversarial jamming
scheme.
Based on Theorem 3, the adversarial jamming scheme
towards the IA network can be summarized as in Algorithm
2.
Algorithm 2 Adversarial jamming scheme
1: The nth time slot begins.
2: The IA network calculate its precoding and decoding
vectors for all the users.
3: The jammer monitors the information transmission of the
IA network, and obtain its instantaneous CSI.
4: The jammer sets the value of the scaling factor [i], i =
1; 2; : : : ;K.
5: According to (38), the jammer calculate its precoding
vector w.
6: The jammer sends spurious data to disrupt the transmis-
sion of the IA network throughout the time slot.
7: Current time slot ends, n = n+ 1, back to Step 1.
Similar to the beneficial jamming scheme in Section III, the
feasibility condition of the adversarial jamming scheme can be
derived as Theorem 4.
Theorem 4: The feasibility condition of the adversarial
jamming scheme can be expressed as
KN  Nj : (39)
8Proof: The proof is the same as that of Theorem 2, which
will not be repeated here.
Disrupted by the adversarial jammer, the transmission rate
of the kth IA user can be rewritten as
R[k]=log2
0@1 + P [k]u[k]yH[kk]v[k]v[k]yH[kk]yu[k]
u[k]y

PjH
[k]
j wwyH
[k]y
j + 
2
n

u[k]
1A ; (40)
where the received jamming signal is treated in the same way
as the background noise, due to the fact that the IA receivers
cannot notice it.
Comparing (12) and (40), we can know that, through
generating the adversarial jamming signal towards the IA
network, the transmission rate of each IA users will be reduced
significantly. In addition, when the feasibility condition of the
proposed adversarial jamming scheme can be satisfied, the
jamming signal will be perfectly aligned into the same sub-
space as that of the desired signal at each IA receiver, which
ensures that the jamming signal cannot be easily perceived by
the IA users.
Remark 3: (1) We can observe that the proposed beneficial
and adversarial jamming schemes towards IA networks are
quite similar, due to the fact that in the beneficial jamming
scheme, the jamming signal is aligned with the interference
at each receiver, while in the adversarial jamming scheme,
the jamming signal is aligned with the desired signal at each
receiver. Therefore, we can exploit similar mechanisms to
achieve totally different goals.
(2) In the adversarial jamming scheme, the performance of
the legitimate IA network will be degraded severely, and the
jamming signal will reduce its DoFs to zero.
(3) The value of  in (34) also reflects the transmit power
of the jamming signal, which will be shown in the simulation
results of Section V. Thus, we can also manage the value of
 to control the transmit power of the jammer.
(4) In practical systems, we may want to measure the
alignment of the jamming signal and the desired signal at
each IA receiver, which reflects the quality in performing the
proposed adversarial jamming scheme. Thus, we define an
indicator as
  =
KX
i=1
H[i]j w ^ H[ii]v[i]2 ; (41)
which shows the quantity of residual jamming signal that is
not aligned at the direction of the desired signal. We will use
this parament   to measure the performance of the proposed
adversarial jamming scheme in Section V.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
In this section, simulation results are presented to evaluate
the performances of the proposed two jamming schemes
towards IA networks. Assume that the MinIL algorithm is
adopted to calculate the solutions of IA [10].
A. Beneficial Jamming Scheme
In this subsection, the performance of the beneficial jam-
ming scheme towards IA networks is simulated. K = 3 IA
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Fig. 3. Comparison of the sum rate of the IA network when the beneficial
jamming scheme is adopted with different values of  and when no precoding
is performed at the jammer. (M = 2, N = 2, K = 3, Nj = 6:)
users are considered, with M = 2 antennas at each transmitter
and N = 2 antennas at each receiver. We also assume that
[1] = [2] = ::: = [K] = . The transmit power of
each IA user and the transmit power at the jammer is set to
P [k] = Pj = 1, k = 1; 2; : : : ;K.
First, the sum rate of the IA network is compared in Fig. 3,
when the beneficial jamming scheme is adopted with different
values of  and the conventional scheme when no precoding
is performed at the jammer. Nj = KN = 6, and according
to Theorem 2, the beneficial jamming scheme is feasible in
this scenario. From the results, we can see that the sum rate
of the IA network when the beneficial jamming scheme is
adopted is much higher than the conventional case when no
precoding is performed at the jammer. In addition, we can also
find that the performance of the IA network is the same, for
different values of , due to the fact that the jamming signal
can be perfectly eliminated at the IA receivers by the beneficial
jamming scheme no matter how large  is. Nevertheless, larger
value of  means higher transmit power of the jamming signal,
which will disrupt the eavesdropping more effectively.
Then, the sum rate of the IA network is compared in Fig. 4,
when the beneficial jamming scheme is adopted with different
values of Nj .  is set to 1. From the results, we can see
that, when Nj  KN = 6, the beneficial jamming scheme
is feasible, which is consistent with Theorem 2, and the sum
rate of the IA network will not be affected. However, when
Nj  5, the proposed scheme is not feasible according to
Theorem 2, and the sum rate of the IA network will decrease
greatly, although the potential eavesdropping can be disrupted.
In addition, the eavesdropping rate with different number
of Ne is compared in Fig. 5, when the jamming signal exists
with different values of Nj or no jamming signal is generated.
SNR=40dB and  = 1. From the results, we can see that, when
no jamming exists, perfect eavesdropping will be achieved
when Ne  K = 3, which is consistent with Proposition 1.
When the beneficial jamming scheme is adopted, perfect will
be achieved when Ne  K +Nj according to Proposition 2,
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no matter whether the scheme is feasible. Thus, increasing the
number of antennas at the jammer will make the IA network
much securer.
In Fig. 6, the transmission rate of the certain IA user and the
eavesdropper rate with different values of Ne are compared,
when the jamming signal exists or not. Nj = 6 and  = 1.
From the results, we can see that, when the beneficial jamming
signal exists, the perfect eavesdropping towards a certain IA
user can be achieved only when Ne  K + Nj = 9, which
is consistent with Proposition 2. Besides, when no jamming
signal exists, the perfect eavesdropping can be achieved when
Ne  K = 3. Thus, we can conclude that the proposed
beneficial jamming scheme can enhance the performance of
secure transmission for the IA network significantly, and Nj
additional antennas should be equipped at the eavesdropper to
perform perfect eavesdropping compared to the traditional IA
scheme without any jamming signal.
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Fig. 7. Comparison of interference leakage at each IA receiver of the
proposed beneficial jamming scheme and the GIA scheme with different
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In Fig. 7, the interference leakage at each IA receiver using
the proposed beneficial jamming scheme and the GIA scheme
is compared with different numbers of antennasM+N . In the
simulation, three IA users are considered, [1] = [2] = ::: =
[K] =  = 1, and SNR= 30dB. From the results, we can see
that less antennas are required for each IA user to eliminate the
jamming signal perfectly by the proposed jamming scheme,
i.e., M + N  4, due to the fact that the jamming signal
is aligned into the interference subspace at each IA receiver
only by the jammer, instead of the IA network. Nevertheless,
enough antennas should be equipped at the jammer to achieve
this, i.e., Nj  6. On the other hand, for the GIA scheme, the
interference can be perfectly eliminated at each IA receiver for
all the values of Nj , as long as M +N is large enough, i.e.,
M+N should be become larger with more jamming antennas.
This is due to the fact that the jamming signal is handled only
by the IA network, and more antennas are needed by each IA
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Fig. 8. Comparison of the sum rate of the IA network when the adversarial
jamming scheme is adopted with different values of  and when no jamming
signal is generated. (M = 2, N = 2, K = 3, Nj = 6:)
user to achieve this. Thus, these two schemes are suitable to be
utilized in different cases with different computing capabilities
of the IA users and jammer.
B. Adversarial Jamming Scheme
In this subsection, the performance of the adversarial jam-
ming scheme towards IA networks is analyzed through simu-
lation. K = 3 IA users are considered, with M = 2 antennas
at each transmitter and N = 2 antennas at each receiver. We
also assume that [1] = [2] = ::: = [K] = . The transmit
power of each IA user and the transmit power at of the jammer
is set to P [k] = Pj = 1, k = 1; 2; : : : ;K.
First, the sum rate of the IA network is compared in Fig.
8, when the adversarial jamming scheme is adopted with
different values of  and when no jamming signal is generated.
Nj = KN = 6, and according to Theorem 4, the adversarial
jamming scheme is feasible in this scenario. From the results,
we can see that, when the adversarial jamming scheme is
adopted, the sum rate of the IA network will be decreased
severely. Besides, we can also see that the sum rate of the
IA network will become lower with larger value of , this is
due to the fact that the parameter  also reflects the transmit
power of the adversarial jammer, according to (34).
Although the proposed adversarial jamming scheme can
achieve excellent performance according to the results in Fig.
9, we cannot know whether the adversarial jamming signal can
be perceived by the IA network. To further verify the capability
of the adversarial jamming scheme in concealing the jamming
signal, the alignment indicator   defined in (41) is compared
with different values of Nj in Fig. 9.  = 1: From the
results, we can see that, when the adversarial jamming scheme
is feasible according to Theorem 4, i.e., Nj  KN = 6,
the indicator   becomes equal to 0, which means that the
jamming signal has been constrained into the same subspace
as that of the desired signal at each IA receiver. Thus, the IA
users cannot perceive the eavesdropping when the proposed
adversarial jamming scheme is feasible.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have proposed two proactive jamming
schemes, which are beneficial and adversarial towards IA net-
works, respectively. First, in the beneficial jamming scheme,
the precoding vector of the jammer is designed to constrain
the jamming signal into the same subspace as that of the
interference among users at each IA receiver, and thus the
potential eavesdropping will be disrupted effectively without
affecting the transmission of the IA network. Then, in the
adversarial jamming scheme, the precoding vector of the
jammer is designed to project the jamming signal into the
same subspace as that of the desired signal at each IA receiver,
which will result in the performance degradation of the IA
network without its noticing. Plenty of simulation results have
been presented to verify the effectiveness of the two proposed
jamming schemes.
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